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Evaluating risky prospects: the Distribution View 
LUC BOVENS 
Analysis (2015)  
Abstract. Risky prospects represent policies that impose different types of 
risks on multiple people.  I present an example from food safety.  A utilitarian 
following Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem ranks such prospects according to 
their mean expected utility or the expectation of the social utility.  Such a 
ranking is not sensitive to any of four types of distributional concerns.  I 
develop a model that lets the policy analyst rank prospects relative to the 
distributional concerns that she considers fitting in the context at hand.  I 
name this model ‘the Distribution View’ posing an alternative to Parfit’s 
Priority View for risky prospects.  
 
Keywords. The Priority View, Prioritarianism, Aggregation Theorem, Risk, 
Prospects, Harsanyi, Parfit  
 
1. Introduction 
A policy with risky outcomes can be modelled as a (risky) prospect. A prospect 
is a matrix of utilities. On the rows we list the people who are affected by the 
policy. In the columns we list alternative states of the world and we specify a 
probability distribution over the states. Each person faces a personal prospect 
on a policy, which is a row in the matrix.  
 A Policy Analyst (PA) may be sensitive to different types of 
distributional concerns in ranking prospects. To engage our intuitions I will 
present some examples from food safety. When we are considering regulation 
of raw food items (say, milk or eggs) it is important to note the distribution of 
 
 
risks in the unregulated prospect. Sometimes the risks are correlated: There is 
a small chance of an outbreak with mass casualties, but there is a good chance 
that there will be no public health problem. Sometimes there is much less of a 
(positive) correlation: There is a good chance that there will be isolated 
casualties, though only a small chance of an outbreak. Sometimes the risks are 
focused on, say, the elderly: We expect there to be casualties among the 
elderly, but others won’t be affected.  
 Such distributional features of prospects play a role in deciding 
whether to adopt regulation and in deciding for what prospects regulation is 
more and less pressing. Regulation of these items is not cost-free—there are 
economic costs, there are health benefits of consuming the raw food, and 
there is just the sheer joy of tasting the raw food.   
 I will consider three idealised prospects which embody different risk 
distributions and a prospect which neutralises these risks. Utility values are 
chosen so that a utilitarian, following Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem (1955), 
is indifferent between these prospects. However, if the PA is sensitive to 
distributional concerns, she will have at least some strict preferences over 
these prospects. The following questions arise: What distributional concerns 
determine these preferences? How can we measure these concerns? How is 
the weight of these concerns determined by the interpretation of the prospect? 
And how can we design a method for determining a ranking over real-life 
prospects?  
 I have named my approach “the Distribution View” in contrast to 
Parfit's Priority View (1997 and, as applied to risky prospects, 2012), which 
also favours the poorly off, but not on distributional grounds. Fleurbaey 
(2010) provides an overview of the literature and defends an evaluation of 
 
 
prospects in terms of the expectation of equally-distributed-equivalents. Other 
relevant literature includes Harsanyi (1955), Diamond (1967), Broome (1984a, 
1984b, 1991), Keeney (1980), Rabinowicz (2001), Adler and Sanchirico 
(2006), McCarthy (2006, 2008), Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009), Chew and 
Sagi (2011), Adler (2011), Bovens and Fleurbaey (2012), and Otsuka (2012). 
Comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper article but can be found in 
Bovens (2015).  
 
 
2. Regulating Correlated Risk, Anti-Correlated and Focused Risk  
In Table 1, there are four idealised prospects, viz. three unregulated prospects 
for food items that represent different risk distributions and the regulated 
prospect. There are three persons (rows) and three equiprobable states 
(columns). We will assume that there are only three utility levels, viz. the 
levels associated with remaining healthy while consuming the unregulated but 
uncontaminated food item (u = 1), with death resulting from consuming the 
unregulated contaminated food item (u = 0), and with consuming the 
regulated food item while remaining healthy but incurring the costs (u = 2/3). 
Utilities are measured on a ratio scale and the zero point represents the worst 
outcome that may actualise for the type of policy that is under consideration.   
 There are Correlated Risk (CR) and Focused Risk (FR) which we 
described in section 1. When there is no positive correlation, then risks are 
typically independent in the real world. However, Anti-Correlated Risk (ACR) 
brings out the same normative features of independent risk in our analysis 
and can be represented in a three-column matrix. And finally there is the case 
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Table 1. Four prospects 
 
 We can calculate the value of a prospect on the ex ante route or on the 
ex post route. On the ex ante route we first calculate the value of each personal 
prospect on the rows and then calculate the value of the prospect on grounds 
of the values of the personal prospects. On the ex post route we first calculate 
the value of each state in the columns and then calculate the value of the 
prospect on grounds of the values of the states. ‘Ex post’ is a standard term in 
the literature which is somewhat ill chosen since an ex post evaluation is also 
conducted before the chance event happens. It is named ‘ex post’ because it 
evaluates the prospect from the perspective of the states that may actualise 
and not from the perspective of each person's individual prospect.   
 On the ex ante route, a utilitarian will calculate the average expected 
utility, which is 2/3 in all prospects. On the ex post route, she calculates the 
 
 
expectation of the average utility in each state, which, by simple algebra, is 
identical to the average expected utility. Hence, a utilitarian, who is not 
sensitive to distributional concerns, is indifferent between these prospects. 
However, a PA who is sensitive to distributional concerns will prefer 
Regulation to at least some of these unregulated prospects.  
 I will show, for each unregulated prospect, what kind of distributional 
concerns a PA may invoke to justify her preference for Regulation over the 
unregulated prospect.  
1)  Regulating Correlated Risk 
a) Ex ante. The PA prefers Regulation to Correlated Risk because 
she is sensitive to the risk that each person is facing. Granted, if 
the people in the prospect are expected utility maximisers then 
they are indifferent between their personal prospects on 
Correlated Risk and on Regulation. But the PA is unwilling to 
accept this risk on their behalf. We say that she is sensitive to the 
intra-personal-prospect distribution.   
b) Ex post. The PA prefers Regulation to Correlated Risk because 
she wishes to avoid the chance that a catastrophe will ensue in 
which all would die. She is sensitive to the inter-state 
distribution.   
2) Regulating Anti-Correlated Risk 
a) Ex ante. Same as in 1a.  
b) Ex post. The PA prefers Regulation to Anti-Correlated Risk 
because she is sensitive to the unequal distribution within each 
state that may actualise. In each state, some people are very well 
off at the cost of other people (or, in our idealisation, of one 
 
 
person) who are (is) very poorly off. Everyone should be willing 
to shoulder some of the costs of regulation to avoid such an 
unequal distribution. She is sensitive to the intra-state 
distribution.     
3) Regulating Focused Risk 
a) Ex ante. The PA prefers Regulation to Focused Risk because she 
is sensitive to the unequal expectations that people are facing. 
She is sensitive to the inter-personal-prospect distribution.   
b) Ex post. Same as in 2b.  
Note that 3a and 3b are the same. In fact, there is no ex ante route that is 
distinct from the ex post route since Focused Risk is in effect a certain 
prospect—i.e. it does not affect anyone’s utility what state of the world 
actualises. But it is worth making this conceptual distinction if we keep in 
mind that Focused Risk is a stylised case of a real world in which the risk is 
disproportionately focused on some people and not on others. Assuming that 
one person is bound to die is just an idealisation. In 3a the PA is sensitive to 
the fact that people face unequal expectations. In 3b she is sensitive to the 
unequal distribution in the many states that may actualise when risks are 
disproportionately focused.  
 The PA can justify her preference for Regulation in each case by 
pointing to an ex ante distributional feature and by pointing to an ex post 
distributional feature. On the ex ante route, these distributional features are 
either intra-personal-prospect or inter-personal-prospect. On the ex post 
route, these distributional features are either intra-state or inter-state. We 
summarise the concerns which the PA may invoke to justify her preference in 




 Ex ante Ex post 
Correlated Risk Intra-personal-prospect Inter-state 
Anti-Correlated Risk Intra-personal-prospect Intra-state 
Focused Risk Inter-personal-prospect Intra-state 
 
Table 2. Distributional concerns prompting strict preferences for Regulation 
 
3. Modelling Distributional Concerns  
There are standard techniques in economic theory to model distributional 
concerns, for example in measuring risk aversion for gambles over monetary 
amounts or inequality aversion for monetary amounts allocated to multiple 
people. For risk aversion, we determine the certainty equivalent, i.e. the 
monetary amount which is such that one is indifferent between receiving this 
amount and participating in the actual gamble. For inequality aversion, we 
determine the equally distributed equivalent, i.e. the monetary amount which 
is such that one is indifferent between everyone receiving this amount or the 
actual allocation in question. (Atkinson 1970: 249–52 and, as applied to 
prospects, Fleurbaey 2010: 658).  
 Risk aversion can be measured by means of various one-parameter 
functions which yield the following certainty equivalents. For the parameter’s 
infimum, the certainty equivalent is the expectation of the gamble (for risk 
neutrality); for its supremum, it is the lowest prize (for extreme risk aversion); 
and it is a monotonically decreasing function for intermediate values. For 
example, in an equiprobable chance distribution <State 1: $16; State 2: $4൐, 
 
 
the certainty equivalent is $10 for the parameter’s infimum, $4 for the 
parameter’s supremum and a monotonically decreasing function for 
intermediate values.  
 Inequality aversion can be measured by means of the same one-
parameter functions yielding equally distributed equivalents. Take an 
allocation <Person 1: $16; Person 2: $4൐: For the parameter’s infimum, the 
equally distributed equivalent is $10, i.e. the average amount allocated (for 
inequality neutrality); for its supremum, it is $4, i.e. the worst amount 
allocated (for extreme inequality aversion); and it is a monotonically 
decreasing function for intermediate values.  
 The parameter value measures sensitivity to a distribution—ranging 
from non-sensitivity for (risk or inequality) neutrality and maximum 
sensitivity for extreme (risk or neutrality) aversion.     
 For starters, it is sufficient to specify one such function with a 
particular parameter value (see section 6) representing moderate sensitivity to 
the distribution.  This function squares the expectation of the square roots of 
the monetary values in the chance distribution or squares the average of the 
square roots of the monetary values in the allocation. For example, the 
certainty equivalent of the equiprobable distribution <State 1: $16; State 2: 
$4൐ equals (1/2√$16 + 1/2√$4)2 = $9. A person who is characterised by this 
function is mildly risk averse: She is willing to pay $9 for the gamble, i.e. 
slightly less than its expected value of $10. Similarly, the equally distributed 
equivalent of of the allocation  <Person 1: $16; Person 2: $4> equals 
((√$16+√$4)/2)2 = $9. A person who is characterised by this function is 
mildly inequality averse: She is indifferent between the actual allocation and 
 
 
an allocation in which all have $9, i.e. slightly less than the average allocation 
of $10.   
 We model the PA’s sensitivity to the various distributional concerns by 
applying this function to the row utilities for the intra-personal-prospect 
distributional concern, to the column utilities for the intra-state distributional 
concern, to the expectations for the inter-personal-prospect distributional 
concern, and to the social utilities (i.e. the averages of the utilities in each 
state) for the inter-state distributional concern.  
 Let us show how this works for a PA who is comparing Correlated Risk 
and Regulation on the ex ante route with a concern for the intra-personal-
prospect distribution. In Correlated Risk, the value of each individual prospect 
is (1/3√0 + 1/3√1 + 1/3√1)2 = 4/9. The value of the prospect is the average 
value of the individual prospects, i.e. 4/9. In Regulation, the value of each 
individual prospect is (1/3ඥ2/3 + 1/3ඥ2/3+ 1/3ඥ2/3)2= 2/3 and so the value of 
the prospect is 2/3. Hence the PA prefers Regulation, which has value 2/3, to 
Correlated Risk, which has value 4/9.  
 Similar calculations show that Regulation is preferred to Correlated 
Risk, to Anti-Correlated Risk and to Focused Risk, each time with one ex ante 
and one ex post concern pointing in the same direction. The evaluation of 
prospects will not always be this straightforward, as we will see in the next 
section.  
 
4. Ordering Unregulated Prospects 
Suppose that there are the three unregulated prospects in Table 1. The PA has 
decided that bringing in regulation for each prospect is advisable for 
 
 
distributional reasons, citing some of the reasons mentioned in section 2. But 
there is austerity and the government cannot afford regulating all prospects. 
What we need is an ordering over the unregulated prospects: Which one is 
worse, and hence more in need of regulation, and which one is not so bad, and 
hence less in need of regulation? Let us turn to pairwise comparisons.  
4) Correlated Risk vs Anti-Correlated Risk 
a) Ex post. The PA chooses to regulate Correlated Risk, since she 
finds Correlated Risk worse than Anti-Correlated Risk. The 
reason is that she wants to avoid the chance that there will be a 
catastrophe with everyone dying. She is sensitive to the inter-
state distribution.     
b) Ex post. The PA chooses to regulate Anti-Correlated Risk, since 
she finds Anti-Correlated Risk worse than Correlated Risk. The 
reason is that she is averse to the inequality that is present in 
any state that may actualise in Anti-Correlated Risk. She is 
sensitive to the intra-state distribution. 
 Is there a right answer? Much depends on how we interpret the 
prospect. If the worst outcome is death, the PA may be more sensitive to the 
inter-state distribution and be foremost concerned with avoiding the chance 
of catastrophe in Correlated Risk. If the worst outcome is that the people who 
fall ill are out of money, say, due to medical expenses, leading to huge 
inequalities, then the PA may be more sensitive to the intra-state distribution 




 Ex ante Ex post 
ACR ≻ CR  inter-state 
CR ≻ ACR  intra-state 
 
Table 3. Anti-Correlated Risk vs. Correlated Risk 
 
5) Anti-Correlated Risk vs Focused Risk 
(a) Ex ante. The PA chooses to regulate Focused Risk since she 
considers Focused Risk worse than Anti-Correlated Risk. She 
cares about the distribution of the expectations: All the risk 
should not be focused on one person. She is sensitive to the 
inter-personal-prospect distribution.  
(b) Ex ante. The PA chooses to regulate Anti-Correlated Risk since 
she considers Anti-Correlated Risk worse than Focused Risk. 
She cares about the distribution within each person's personal 
prospect. In the case of Anti-Correlated Risk, everyone faces the 
risk of dying. In the case of Focused Risk, everyone has a certain 
prospect. The PA is sensitive to the intra-personal-prospect 
distribution.  
 Is there a right answer? In the context of food safety, 5b may strike us 
as so inhumane that it is outright ludicrous as a moral stand. Indeed, there is 
lack of risk in Focused Risk, but this lack of risk is beneficial for person 2 and 




 All depends on the interpretation of the prospect. Granted, in our food 
safety context, there is little to be said for focused risk. If there is bound to be 
risk, then it is better that the risk be spread than that it fall only on the elderly. 
But here are a few different interpretations.  
 Suppose that we need to decide between admission tests. The test 
selects the i top persons out of n applicants—in our example the single two top 
people out of three applicants. One test is highly reliable whereas the other 
leaves much to chance. If we construct the prospects relative to full knowledge 
of the skill set of the applicants, then the risk would be Focused Risk on the 
reliable test and Anti-Correlated Risk on the test that leaves much to chance. 
In this case the PA should clearly choose for the reliable test—i.e. Anti-
Correlated Risk is worse than Focused Risk.  (Cf. Broome 1984b: 55)    
 Here is a case with independent risk (bringing out the same normative 
features as Anti-Correlated Risk). Let there be an equal number of casualties 
from base-jumping and from urban cycling. The base-jumping casualties are 
focused on a few daredevils and the urban cycling casualties are spread among 
many commuters. The PA can invest in increasing either base-jumping safety 
or urban-cycling safety. It is reasonable to say that the base-jumpers carry a 
greater responsibility due to the higher risks they are assuming and society 
should not prioritise those who bring their bad luck upon themselves. Hence 
the PA should invest in increasing urban-cycling safety—i.e. independent risk 




 Ex ante Ex post 
ACR ≻ FR inter-personal-prospect  
FR ≻ ACR intra-personal-prospect  
            
Table 4. Anti-Correlated Risk vs.  Focused Risk 
 
6) Correlated Risk vs Focused Risk 
(a) Ex ante.  Same tension as in 5a and 5b.  
(b) Ex post. Same tension as in 4a and 4b.  
We can construct similar examples as in comparisons 4 and 5 to make these 
tensions plausible. For example, urban cyclists who have to cross a bridge that 
has structural problems and may collapse under the weight of rush-hour 
traffic face correlated risk. Again, it is reasonable to invest in bridge safety 
rather than base-jumping safety.   
 
 Ex ante Ex post 
CR ≻ FR inter-personal-prospect intra-state 
FR ≻ CR  intra-personal-prospect inter-state 
 
Table 5. Correlated Risk vs. Focused Risk 
 
5.  Single-Concern Prospect Assessment  
We can now construct a simple model covering all prospects. The PA is only 
allowed to cite one distributional concern. In the problem at hand, she is 
concerned about (i) reducing outcome inequalities (ex post intra-state), (ii) 
 
 
avoiding catastrophes (ex post inter-state), (iii) reducing the risk facing 
individuals (ex ante intra-personal-prospect), or (iv) reducing unequal 
expectations (ex ante inter-personal-prospect). If she mentions an ex ante 
concern, we will do the requisite ex ante calculation, whereas if she mentions 
an ex post concern, we will do the requisite ex post calculation.  
 For example, suppose she says that she is concerned about reducing 
outcome inequalities. She is sensitive to the intra-state distribution which 
enters in on the ex post route. We can simply read off from tables 3, 4 and 5 
that CR ≻ ACR ~ FR. In table 2, we note that the intra-state distribution 
sensitivity does not favour CR over R and hence the ranking R ~ CR holds.  
 An ex post calculation, as laid out in section 3, with sensitivity to the 
intra-state distribution yields precisely the same ordering. Other cases are 







Ex post Intra-State R ~ CR ≻ ACR ~ FR 
Avoid 
catastrophes 











Ex ante  Intra-
Personal-
Prospect 
R ~ FR ≻ ACR ~ CR  
 
Table 6. Ranking of prospects for single-concern PAs 
 
 The basic model for the assessment of prospects on the Distribution 
View is now in place. We can now add various layers of complexity so as to 
move closer to real-world prospect assessment. 
 
6.  Towards Real-World Prospect Assessment 
In the real world, the PA will be facing prospects affecting multiple people and 
with many not necessarily equiprobable states. This poses no problem. If we 
have matrices of utilities measured on a ratio scale and we have recorded the 
type of distributional concerns that the PA brings to bear to the problem at 
hand, then we calculate the value of each prospect. 
 We can also give up on the binary framework and permit the PA to 
register different levels of distributional sensitivities. So far we have assumed 
 
 
that a particular distributional sensitivity is either on or off. If it is on, then the 
the function maps a vector into the square of the average of the square roots of 
the vector’s values. If it is off, then the function maps a vector into the average 
of the vector’s values. This binary function is a special case of the following 
one-parameter family with γ = ½ for on and γ = 0 for off: 
  




 for γ ∈ ሾ0,൅∞ሻ and γ് 1; 
     exp	ቀ∑ ୪୬	ሺ௩೔ሻ೙೔సభ௡ ቁ  for γ = 1.  
 
The function ranges from 0 risk neutrality (for equiprobable states) or 
inequality neutrality to +∞ for extreme risk aversion or inequality aversion. 
(Cf. Fleurbaey, 2010.) This permits us to model the PA’s sensitivity to a 
particular distribution on a continuous scale. 
 So far our PA was only allowed to register a single concern. We can also 
model a PA who registers multiple distributional concerns.  
 She may wish to apply these concerns in a lexical fashion. For example, 
suppose that she says that it is of foremost importance to her to reduce 
individual risk and, if there is a tie, then she wishes to avoid catastrophes. 
Look at Table 6: By sensitivity to the Intra-Personal-Prospect Distribution, R 
~ FR ≻ ACR ~ CR and by sensitivity to the Inter-State Distribution, we break 
the tie: R ~ FR ≻ ACR ≻ CR.  
 Alternatively, she may wish to give these concerns different weights. 
Now suppose that she assesses the prospects on the ex ante route and 
registers ex ante distributional sensitivities of different strengths. For 
example, she may set her sensitivity to the intra-personal-prospect 
 
 
distribution at γ = 1/2 and the sensitivity to the inter-personal-prospect 
distribution at γ = 2/3. Then the value of each personal prospect is the square 
of the average of the utilities’ square roots and the value of the prospect is the 
cube of the average of individual-prospect values’ cube roots.  
 Let us see how this plays out using our calculus. We first calculate the 
value of each personal prospect following (1). Note that if v = v1 = ... = vn, then 
ൌ 	݂ሺ൏ ݒଵ, … , ݒ௡ ൐ሻ ൌ ݒ for any value of γ. So for R, the value of each person’s 
personal prospect equals 2/3. For FR, the value of one person’s personal 
prospect equals 0 and of the other two people 1. For ACR and CR, the value of 
each person’s personal prospect equals (1/3√1 + 1/3√1 + 1/3√0)2 = 4/9. We 
can now calculate the overall values of the prospects. For R, the overall value 
equals 2/3. For ACR and CR, the overall value equals 4/9. And for FR, the 
overall value equals ൫1/3√1య ൅ 1/3√1య ൅ 	1/3√0య ൯ଷ ൌ 8/27. Hence, R ≻ ACR ~ 
CR ≻ FR. 
 To get an intuitive feel for this result, return to Table 6. On ground of 
sensitivity to the inter-personal-prospect distribution we have R ~ ACR ~ CR 
≻ FR. Sensitivity to the intra-personal-prospect distribution would dictate FR 
≻	ACR ~ CR. But the latter sensitivity is weaker than the former and so ACR ~ 
CR ≻ FR stands. The latter sensitivity also dictates R ≻ ACR ~ CR. And even 
though it is a weaker sensitivity, it is strong enough to break through the tie 
between R on the one hand and ACR ~ CR on the other hand. Hence, in line 
with our calculus, R ≻ ACR ~ CR ≻ FR. 	 
 But what should we do when the PA registers both ex ante and ex post 
sensitivities? To model this, we need to make an additional assumption: The 
relative strength of the PA’s ex ante and ex post distributional sensitivities 
 
 
should determine the relative prominence of the ex ante route and the ex post 
route in her calculations. So suppose that she attaches limited weight to all 
sensitivities (say, γ = 1/2) except to the inter-state-distribution (say, γ = 3/2). 
Then the value of the prospect is the weighted sum of the ex ante value of the 
prospect and of the ex post value of the prospect. The weights are the relative 
weights of the sum of the ex ante parameters (i.e. (1/2 + 1/2) / (1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 
+ 3/2) = 1/3) and of the sum of the ex post parameters (i.e. (1/2 + 3/2) / (1/2 
+ 1/2 + 1/2 + 3/2) = 2/3.  
 We can now specify a general method for evaluating prospects which 
can work with any distributional sensitivity the PA may hold. Rather than 
adding more formalism, we will do so in a discursive manner.  
(a) To determine the value of a prospect, we specify its ex ante value and 
its ex post value.  
(b) To determine the ex ante value, we first calculate the value of each 
personal prospect by applying the function f to the row utilities with a 
value for the parameter γ that expresses the PA’s sensitivity to the 
intra-personal-prospect distribution. We then calculate the ex ante 
value of the prospect, by applying f to the values of the personal 
prospects with a value for γ that expresses the PA’s sensitivity to the 
inter-personal-prospect distribution.  
(c) To determine the ex post value, we first calculate the value of each state 
by applying f to the column utilities with a value for γ that expresses the 
PA’s sensitivity to the intra-state distribution. We then calculate the ex 
post value of the prospect by applying f to the values of the states with a 




(d) The value of the prospect is the weighted sum of the ex ante and the ex 
post values, with the weights being the relative weights of the sum of 
the ex ante parameters and the sum of the ex post parameters over the 
sum of all parameters.  
(e) The PA weakly prefers one prospect over another if the value of the 
former weakly exceeds the value of the latter.  
 We can work this general method towards reflective equilibrium. First, 
we can try to elicit the specific distributional sensitivities of a PA by presenting 
her with limited information concerning prospects. For example, we can 
present her with sets of expectations and determine her equally distributed 
equivalents to assess her inter-personal-prospect sensitivity. The same holds 
for her other distributional sensitivities. Second, we can elicit a ranking over 
full-fledged prospects and determine (by computational means) what range of 
the four parameter values would generate such rankings. We can generate a 
consistent model of the PA’s assessment of prospects by working back and 
forth until we have eliminated inconsistencies and reached reflective 
equilibrium.     
 We can also use the model for the purpose of constructing a normative 
ordering over prospects in a particular sphere of policy making. I argued 
above that for certain types of policies certain distributional sensitivities may 
be more or less fitting. Spelling out sphere-specific norms for relative 
sensitivities will provide guidance in policy ranking.1 
                                                 
1  I am grateful for discussions with Richard Bradley, Marc Fleurbaey, Alexandru 




London School of Economics and Political Science 
Department  of  Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method 






Adler, M.D. and Sanchirico, C.W. 2006. Inequality and uncertainty: theory 
and legal applications. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155: 279–377. 
Adler, M. 2011. Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit 
Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bovens, L. 2015. Concerns for the poorly off in ordering risky prospects. 
Economics and Philosophy (forthcoming).   
Broome, J. 1984a. Uncertainty and Fairness. Economic Journal, 94: 624–32. 
Broome, J. 1984b. Selecting People Randomly. Ethics, 95: 38–55. 
————— 1991. Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Atkinson, A.B. 1970. On the Measurement of Inequality. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 2: 244–263. 
Bovens, L. and Fleurbaey, M. 2012. Evaluating Life or Death Prospects. 
Economics and Philosophy, 28: 217–249. 
                                                                                                                                            




Chew, H.S. and Sagi, J.S. (2011) An Inequality Measure for Stochastic 
Allocations. Journal of Economic Theory 147: 1517-1544.  
Diamond, P. (1967) Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Comment. Journal of Political 
Economy 75: 765–766.  
Fleurbaey, M. (2010) Assessing risky social situations. Journal of Political 
Economy 118: 649–680. 
Harsanyi, J. (1955) Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy 3: 309–21. 
Keeney, R.L. (1980) Equity and public risk. Operations Research 28: 527–
534. 
McCarthy, M. (2006) Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism I. Economics and 
Philosophy, 22: 335–63.  
————— (2008) Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism II. Economics and 
Philosophy, 24: 1–33.  
Otsuka, M. and Voorhoeve A.E. (2009) Why it Matters that Some are Worse 
off than Others: an Argument against the Priority View. Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 37: 172–99. 
Otsuka, M. (2012) Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 
24: 365–380.  
Parfit D. (1997) Equality and Priority. Ratio (new series), X 3, 202–221.  
Parfit, D. (2012) Another Defence of the Priority View. Utilitas, 24: 399–440. 
Rabinowicz, W. (2002) Prioritarianism for Prospects. Utilitas, 14: 2–21. 
 
